Question?
Jim asked an interesting question the other day. Has anyone done any work to quantify the likelihood that (the oil and gas) platforms will exceed their currently expected lifespans?
At the end of the day, risk is managed on a continual basis and the likelihood of a platform being required to exceed it’s original design life is probably around 100%. However the original design, and any later changes, is required to be constantly being reviewed against the asset Safety Case. The asset Safety Case is the legal document that must identify and manage all hazards relating to the asset. As a starting point the “Integrity of physical resources is assured through design, construction and procurement in accordance with recognised codes, standards and practices.” As time goes on potential hazards in new and existing plant are identified systematically, risks evaluated and reduced to ALARP levels by appropriate engineering and managerial methods. The continuing integrity of plant and equipment is controlled through inspection and maintenance managements.
For example, the Bruce was originally composed of two jackets, the Process Utilities and Quarters (PUQ) and Drilling (D). A third was added 8 years after commissioning to receive and compress gas from the Rhum oil field tie back. Export risers, compression equipment and all manner of controls will have been updated and re-validated to conform to the new operating conditions, changing their design life. These changes are captured through various risk assessment procedures/studies, such as Layers of Protection Analysis (LOPA), Hazard ID (HAZID), Hazard and Operability (HAZOP), throughout every stage of the project. The higher the risk, the higher the sign off required of the risk mitigation within the organisation. I have found that individuals are generally very diligent with respect to their responsibilities when signing off as a technical authority.
Of course this kind of development results in different parts of the asset being designed for different (relative) design lives. Another consideration is that the design process conditions may not ultimately reflect the operational process conditions. The Bruce test well must have showed no indication of H2S in the formation and so the installation was designed with the minimal capacity for sour service. However, there is every chance that the well could have gone sour over time as different areas of the formation were accessed. In the case of Clair, H2S levels have increased consistently, with 500ppm expected over the next few years. This type of change has a significant effect on the life span of pipes, heat exchangers, valves etc. At the end of the day, the design life of the installation is something that is constantly changing and being reviewed on a regular basis.
I do find it worrying that in my 3 months here I have come across several instances of under design despite conformance to the appropriate code.
Bruce P 60 Bridge bearings – aggregate travel of the bearings was many times what was predicted.
Bruce Caissons – Premature structural failure due to under design of the caisson walls. It turns out that secondary forces around the sub and above sea guides were not modelled.
Clair Coolers – Under design of Coolers resulting in shell side weld corrosion.
Clair Coolers – Over stressed piping runs due to apparent lack of consideration of cyclic process conditions. FEA has shown that on start up and shut down the pipe stress exceeds tolerance and the speculation is that the pipes were designed for steady state operation only.
One issue I am currently dealing with revolves around conformance with a BP general practice which recommends that impact tested Low Temperature Carbon Steel is used on all new pipework. By ensuring that impact Tested LTCS is used throughout, the risk of using non-impact tested LTCS in the wrong place is mitigated and Procurement and Supply Chain Management (PSCM) is easier for projects. However the Clair piping specs state that non-impact tested LTCS be used (ASTM A106 Gr B), so I have had to raise and approve a deviation for an approved practice so that we can use a pipe which has a higher specification (ASTM A333 Gr6). A333 has slightly lower % manganese, sulphur, phos and carbon content, but tensile and yeild strengths are identical. The only differences are in the testing regime, with impact testing specified for A333 and not for A106. Here’s the kicker, for A106 to have been used on the cooler project it would have needed impact testing to conform to BP standard practices. The problem lies in the asset piping specs and they are clearly overdue for updating.
Asset longevity is, therefore, a delicate balance of mitigated risk against productivity. The items listed above are all managed with inspection regimes, intervention repairs and replacement programmes. Unfortunately it appears to me that there is potentially a significant amount of un-identified risk within the industry which can only increase as time goes on. In the case of the over stressed pipe work on the Clair, a project is being initiated to survey all of the pipework on the installation that might be at risk from this same issue.
I would be interested to know if the Army uses/has instances where it would need a change management system. The only thing that I have been able to come up with is the seven questions, sort of a management of change on the battlefield. Ideas?
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I’d suggest that the military more than most need change mangement processes because the nature and location of operation change frequently, the personnel and equipment are in continual flux and the drivers for change lie outwith the control of strategic mangement. The need is clouded by being interwoven with interoperability issues and the constant need for thrusting individuals to deny the existance of problems and say how well everything is going up to, and frequently beyond, the point wherby it is apparent from the side lines that this is not the case. The modus operandii appears to be one of new broom sweeps clean – ignore any previous policy and the effort of any predecessor put into delivering a long term solution and start on something new that will in turn be swept aside rather than built upon by the successor. Not I would suggest the most efficient way to run an army but then efficiency is not a KPI, visible effect is….
I’m not too sure that the change process is the thing that the Army needs to focus on, there are loads of processes. To my mind there is an absence of understanding of the point at which change needs to be implemented. I would argue that the new broom doesn’t sweep clean it just keeps pushing the same pile in the wrong direction!
Strategic position is a function of environment, culture, purpose and capability. If capability goes unchallenged ie the relationship between resources and competence then the “can do” culture drives on regardless, This leads to drift as time progresses with the Army refusing to adapt, believing that it will be able to cut a path through the “noise” around it.
Ultimately it gets to the point where organisational culture drives itself on a trajectory that does not really reflect its environment and the only way to regain is to make large step changes without understanding the effects which then go on to the flux that Richard describes.
As for instances of a need for change management how about recognising the need to transition to more permanent infrastructure – HV power distribution, large scale wastewater treatment, Tier 3 construction, renewables, town planning?
Just to clarify, “strategy”? – That thing you’re thinking? Its not that….
From your description, it would also seem that there is a potential issue in that the consequence of one risk being realised on the other risks present within the platform doesn’t appear to have been formally modelled, nor a hierarchy of the importance (both financial and in terms of potential outcome for the platform), of the risks established. Do you know if this work has been done?
Probably just flaws in my description. The risk analysis techniques do a very good job of modelling the identified risks, including secondary effects where appropriate. I think the problem lies in the complexity of these installations concealing issues that are potentially hazardous. It isn’t so much a case of identifying a hazard cascade, but the fact that blind reliance on design codes is not a guarantee of risk mitigation.
It kind of links to the argument that relying on the diligent and thrusting nature of Army Captains is no substitute for good doctrine and I think the result is that the Army needs attention paid to how we manage change. I have heard it said on all of my MA courses, British Army Captains prefer to avoid rather than manage risk. I am just starting to understand what they were talking about!