Yippie kay yay
I was planning on blogging about flushing and COA analysis for drainage, however, something much more interesting has cropped up today (in my opinion), so I’m afraid you’ll have to wait until next week for the car chase.
As a side note, before I start my blog, I’ve not seen any phase 1 students commenting on blogs on here. I know I was guilty of not commenting whilst on phase 1. If there is anything in particular that you want to know about on site, please let me know and I’ll try and tailor future blogs cover those topics.
I was always under the impression that 09.50 and 21.50 were cow-boy time. Not on BPSP1, its cow-boy time 24/7.
A few months ago I blogged about getting a temporary substation (TSS3) brought onto site. It has finally come to the stage when we’re going to connect TSS3 to the rest of the HV distribution network. This is to be done in two stages, initially TSS3 will be connected to TSS2 to create an even bigger radial. At a later date TSS3 will be connected to our DNO switch room to provide a ring main. This blog will focus on the first phase which is being conducted today.
In preparing for these works I reviewed the RAMS that were submitted by Wyse Power (our temporary electrical sub-contractor). After a bit of back and forth they were signed off at status A. This is an extract of part of the methodology:
1) Operatives will attend site for site specific induction as per the site rules.
2) Operative will read, understand and sign off this method statement and sign the back sheet.
3) The senior site operative (WP SAP & HVMS SAP) will carry out a site survey and POWRA– what risks will interface with works coordinate with site management and carry out a pre works check with all other WysePower operatives.
4) SAP (James Sherlock) to sign on and accept AP duties.
5) SAP to write up switching log and have approved by second SAP (Kevin Poole).
TSS2 to TSS3
6) SAP to carry out isolation and apply earth to SF6 Ring to TSS2 Ring Switch, fit safety lock and caution sign. SAP to fit danger sign to adjacent live equipment and HVMS SAP to witness. See ref 1 on schematic.
7) SAP to carry out isolation and apply earth to SF6 Ring to TSS3 Ring Switch, fit safety lock and caution sign. SAP to fit danger sign to adjacent live equipment and HVMS SAP to witness. See ref 2 on schematic.
8) SAP to confirm dead to jointing team.
9) SAP to issue permit to work for the connection of TSS3 to TSS2 SAP HMVS will hold the keys to the locks.
All pretty straight forward stuff. I spoke to the SAP yesterday and warned him off that as part of my education I’d like to come down and see how the above process worked in reality. The key part here is that Wyse Power knew that I was going to visit them. HVMS are a cable jointing firm who are being subcontracted by Wyse Power to connect the HV cable into the ring main units.
So what happened when I got to site?
Point 1 above- Complete
Point 2 – no RAMS on site and James confirmed to me that he hadn’t seen the RAMS. ARGHHHH!!!!!!
Point 3 – Complete
Point 4 – Not done.
Point 5 – No switching log present. The second SAP mentioned above is a project manager who is off site and therefore cannot sign the paperwork unless it was completed in advance.
Point 6 , 7, 8- Works not at this stage yet, but it was being discussed that padlocks be left off whilst the HVMS SAP went to get his own.
Point 7 – SNo permit to work produced.
Essentially the works being carried out are very basic, both the switches involved are already switched off and earthed and because of that the guys involved have got complacent. I had to stop the works, bring the SAP (James) up to my office and physically give him a copy of the RAMS, we then sat down and read through the RAMS. He then went away and produced all the necessary paperwork. We managed to get round the issue of the second SAP (Kevin who wasn’t on site) countersigning the switching log by virtue of the fact one of the HVMS workers was an SAP and was able to countersign.
All in all very simple to sort out, but hugely frustrating that I had to get involved in the first place.
Holdfast Training Services Trial Blog 
Rich,
Interesting, the impression I had got from Phase 1 was that people didn’t mess about with HV in the UK. We had a power outage on the WWTP due to an LV cable strike and I think there was a bit of a cowboy fix. I wasn’t there but apparently there were sparks at the top of the pole.
Henry,
That’s exactly what I thought, but I think the guys were complacent due to the job being very simple. I have no doubt that if I hadn’t gone down there the works would have been completed without an incident and nobody would have known any better. However, in the unlikely event that something had gone wrong then the HSE would have had a field day. The real frustration is that the Wyse power SAP is a really good operator – I feel a bit like I’ve been let down by one of my top NCOs.
It seemed like he confessed pretty quickly and started to follow procedure well though. When I questioned about our sparking there were quite a lot of excuses being thrown around!
Was there any come back on your guys? Our chap has already had his “final” warning from CCL, so on Tuesday he’s getting his “final, final” warning from his own H&S director – an utter joke. Even if he was moved on it would only be to another project where I doubt he’d change his approach and we’d probably end up with a replacement who was more of a cow boy and not as good at getting issues resolved.
It was the base’s equivalent of an AP who caused the sparking and I was the most outraged person I came across. As I wasn’t an eye witness, and I’m not an expert I didn’t really chase it up: perhaps I’m going native! I’ll chase it up with our lead H&S guy on Monday and see if there is a procedure on that. As it was a Government Employee I imagine it will be some sort of pointless warning but if it was a contractor they would be off the job the next day.
Oh and I’m with you on the phase 1s commenting. It would be good to get some feedback and it could really help us relate what we are doing back to what we learnt in phase 1. I don’t think we understood the full point of the blog in phase 1 but essentially now I see it as a means of dialogue. Or for Mike a pseudo Facebook 😉
Rich – Unfortunately it seems we are similar in that contractors arrive without signing their own method statements and risk assessments. The crazy thing is, they are normally employed because of being expert in their field – great, but it would be nice to know they are following the correct, or even their own procedures. I suspect people push it and hope they do not meet diligent engineers.
The MOD killed an electrical technician in the old main building about 15 years ago. This was during a routine switching operation for maintenance and therein lay the problem. There was a”standard” method statement for the job that the AP used to get out and just copy each time it was needed. The problem was that there was a mistake in the original copy of the paperwork. This was OK whilst the bloke that wrote the first method statement was supervising the job, when he left though it was a bomb waiting to go off. During the final phase of construction of T5, a lift technician was killed because the correct isolation procedure wasn’t followed before he went to work in the lift shaft. They were under pressure to get the job done quickly. People regularly involved in risky work become desensitised to the dangers and start to take short cuts. A lot of academic oil has been burnt studying this effect and the safety rules and procedures we use are largely the consequence of the insights this work has delivered. The problem is that humans will nearly always resort to trying to take the least line of resistance when they are under pressure. This is particularly true of males.
Thanks for the historical examples Jim, it gives me further reassurance that I wasn’t bein a complete pedant. Although I believe fruit & veg and not bombs go off…
And you we’re so close to convincing the others that you aren’t a pedant…..😂